Abstract A matrix M is said to be k-anonymous if for each row r in M there are at least k − 1 other rows in M which are identical to r . The NP-hard k-Anonymity problem asks, given an n × m-matrix M over a fixed alphabet and an integer s > 0, whether M can be made k-anonymous by suppressing (blanking out) at most s entries. Complementing previous work, we introduce two new "data-driven" parameterizations for k-Anonymity-the number t in of different input rows and the number t out of different output rows-both modeling aspects of data homogeneity. We show that k-Anonymity is fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter t in , and that it is NPhard even for t out = 2 and alphabet size four. Notably, our fixed-parameter tractability result implies that k-Anonymity can be solved in linear time when t in is a constant. Our computational hardness results also extend to the related privacy problems p-Sensitivity and -Diversity, while our fixed-parameter tractability results extend to p-Sensitivity and the usage of domain generalization hierarchies, where the entries are replaced by more general data instead of being completely suppressed.
Introduction
Assume that data about n individuals are represented by length-m vectors consisting of attribute values. In other words, assume that our input is an n × m data matrix with entries from some (potentially large) alphabet . If all vectors (that is, rows) are identical, then we have full homogeneity and thus full anonymity of all individuals. Relaxing full anonymity to k-anonymity (requiring that every vector occurs at least k times), in this work we investigate how the degree of (in)homogeneity (measured by the number of different vectors) both with respect to the input data matrix as well as the corresponding anonymized output data matrix influences the computational complexity of the NP-hard problem of making sets of individuals k-anonymous. Moreover, we extend our investigations to further combinatorial data anonymization problems including the concepts of p-sensitivity and -diversity. Samarati and Sweeney (1998) , Samarati (2001) , and Sweeney (2002b) devised the notion of k-anonymity to better quantify the degree of anonymity in sanitized data. This notion formalizes the intuition that entities who have identical sets of attributes cannot be distinguished from one another. For a positive integer k we say that a matrix M is k-anonymous if, for each row r in M, there are at least k − 1 other rows in M which are identical to r . Thus k-anonymity provides a clear and simple combinatorial model for sanitizing data: choose a value of k which would satisfy the relevant privacy requirements, and then try to modify-"at minimum cost"-the matrix in such a way that it becomes k-anonymous. The corresponding decision problem k-Anonymity asks, additionally given an upper bound s for the number of suppressions allowed, whether a matrix can be made k-anonymous by suppressing (blanking out) at most s entries. While k-Anonymity is our central data anonymization problem, our results also extend to several more restrictive anonymization problems, 1 including p-Sensitivity (Truta and Vinay 2006) and -Diversity (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007) .
Motivation. The increased use of technology brings with it various non-obvious threats to personal privacy. For example, location data from tracking devices-such as Global Positioning System (GPS) devices used in public transport systemsor communication devices-such as mobile phones-can be used by an adversary in space or time-correlated inference attacks to deduce private information about individuals. Another-seemingly unlikely-source of breach of privacy lies in the search logs of web search engines, which are sometimes released as a valuable aid for research on information retrieval. Yet other, perhaps more obvious, sources of private information are medical data or the "relationship graphs" of social networks. The protection of privacy is widely recognized as a human right, and at the same time there are large economic and scientific incentives for analyzing data sets which could potentially reveal private information. To be able to do this without harming privacy, k-Anonymity and its variants have been proposed as a possible approach to addressing privacy concerns arising in all these scenarios (Campan and Truta 2009; Gedik and Liu 2008; Gkoulalas-Divanis et al. 2010; Gruteser and Grunwald 2003; Monreale et al. 2010; Navarro-Arribas et al. 2012; Zhou and Pei 2011) . 2 We focus on a better understanding of the computational complexity and on tractable special cases of combinatorial data privacy problems; see Machanavajjhala et al. (2007) and Sweeney (2002b) for discussions on the pros and cons of these models in terms of privacy vs preservation of meaningful data. In particular, note that with "differential privacy" (cleverly adding some random noise) a "statistical model" has become very popular as well (Dwork 2011; Fung et al. 2010 ); we do not study this here. However, k-Anonymity and its variants are very natural combinatorial problems (with potential applications beyond data privacy) that are easy to interpret with respect to performed data modifications, and-for instance-in the case of "one-time anonymization", are obviously valuable for the sake of providing simple models that do not introduce noise.
Important Variants of k-Anonymity.
While the k-Anonymity problem is described in terms of the operation of suppressing-blanking out-data entries, this level of obfuscation is sometimes not required or desirable. Sweeney (2002a) introduced the notion of domain generalization and domain generalization hierarchies (DGH) as a generalization of-and an alternative to-suppression for achieving k-anonymous datasets. The operation of generalization involves replacing a data entry with a less specific element. For instance, the precise age of a person might be replaced with an age range which includes the given age. The new value, while still being "correct" for the person, is not as precise as the previous one was. This idea is extended to the notion of domain generalization hierarchies, which can be thought of as increasingly more general ranges of data. The operation of suppressing a data element is thus a special case of generalization. The DGH-k-Anonymity problem asks for a minimal-under a certain natural ordering-generalization of the input matrix which is k-anonymous. Observe that the k-Anonymity problem is a special case of DGH-k-Anonymity where the only generalization maps each data element to the " "-symbol; thus DGHk-Anonymity is computationally at least as hard as k-Anonymity; we extend some of our positive results for k-Anonymity to DGH-k-Anonymity.
The attributes used in the well-known linking attack method by Sweeney (2002b) for re-identification were gender, ZIP code and birth date. She called such attributes containing publicly available data quasi-identifiers. Published datasets, such as medical data, consist of these quasi-identifiers and private information (e.g. disease). To protect against a linking attack, it is sufficient to make the quasi-identifiers k-anonymous. Hence, the input matrix M for k-Anonymity contains only quasi-identifiers. This leads to a major drawback of k-Anonymity, namely the possibility that the private information may end up being highly uniform in the output. For example, an attacker cannot determine the row corresponding to one individual but using the linking attack method of Sweeney (2000) he may identify k rows from which exactly one corresponds to the individual. If the private information stored in these k rows is equal, then the attacker does not know the row corresponding to the individual but the private information belonging to the individual is revealed. To prevent this, different concepts were introduced, e.g. p-Sensitivity (Truta and Vinay 2006) , -Diversity (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007) , and t-Closeness (Li et al. 2007 ). We will partially extend our findings for k-Anonymity to p-Sensitivity and -Diversity.
p-Sensitivity is an enhancement to k-Anonymity in the sense that there is the additional requirement that in the output matrix each maximal set of rows that are identical in the quasi-identifiers contains at least p different private values. -Diversity is an enhancement requiring that each such set of rows contains at least "well represented" private values. The combinatorial realization of "well represented" that we use is to require that in each such set of rows the relative frequency of each private value is at most 1/ (Wong et al. 2006; Xiao and Tao 2006) .
Computational Complexity. k-Anonymity and many related problems are NP-hard (Meyerson and Williams 2004) , even when the input matrix is highly restricted. Concerning polynomial-time approximability, k-Anonymity is APX-hard when k = 3, even when the alphabet size is just two (Bonizzoni et al. 2011a) ; it is MAX SNP-hard when k = 7, even when the number of columns in the input dataset is just three (Chakaravarthy et al. 2010) ; and it is MAX SNP-hard when k = 3, even when the number of columns in the input dataset is 27 (Blocki and Williams 2010) . Moreover, it is APXhard when k = 3, even when the input matrix has only three columns (Bonizzoni et al. 2011b ). On the positive side, many polynomial-time approximation algorithms have been developed for the problem and its variants. Meyerson and Williams (2004) devised an approximation algorithm with the approximation ratio O(k ln k) which runs in O(n 2k ) time, and another one which runs in time polynomial in both n and k and has the ratio O(k ln n). Gionis and Tassa (2009) came up with an algorithm which runs in O(n 2k ) time and has the approximation ratio O(ln k). This was later improved upon by Park and Shim (2007) and by Kenig and Tassa (2012) , who devised approximation algorithms with the same ratio and the same worst-case running time, but which run much faster on large classes of inputs.
Parameterized Complexity. Confronted with this computational hardness, we study aspects of the parameterized (or multivariate) computational complexity of k-Anonymity and its variants as initiated by Evans et al. (2009) . The central question here is how naturally occurring parameters influence computational complexity. For example, consider the following parameterization. Is k-Anonymity polynomial-time solvable for constant values of k? While 2-Anonymity is polynomial-time solvable (Blocki and Williams 2010) , the general answer is no since already 3-Anonymity is NP-hard (Meyerson and Williams 2004) , even on binary data sets (Bonizzoni et al. 2011a) . Thus, k alone does not yield a promising parameterization.
k-Anonymity has a number of meaningful parameterizations beyond k, including the number of rows n, the alphabet size | |, the number of columns m, and, in the spirit of multivariate algorithmics (Fellows 2009; Niedermeier 2010) , various combinations of single parameters. Here the arity of the alphabet may range from binary (such as gender) to unbounded (such as net worth). For instance, answering an open question of Evans et al. (2009 ), Bonizzoni et al. (2011b showed that k-Anonymity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the combined parameter (m, | |), whereas there is no hope for fixed-parameter tractability with respect to the single parameters m and | | (Evans et al. 2009 ). We emphasize that Bonizzoni et al. (2011b) made use of the fact that the value | | m is an upper bound on the number of different input rows, thus implicitly exploiting a very rough upper bound on input homogeneity. In this work, we refine this view by asking how the "degree of homogeneity" of the input matrix influences the complexity of k-Anonymity. In other words, is k-Anonymity fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter "number of different input rows"? In a similar vein, we also study the effect of the degree of homogeneity of the output matrix on the complexity of k-Anonymity. Table 1 , which extends similar tables due to Evans et al. (2009) and Bonizzoni et al. (2011b) , summarizes known and new results for k-Anonymity.
Our Contributions. We introduce the "homogeneity parameters" the number t in of different input rows and the number t out of different output rows, for studying the computational complexity of k-Anonymity and related problems. In many practical instances, we expect t in n and t in | | m . The latter relation is "obvious" since | | m just refers to having all possible input rows over the alphabet . The relation t in n, however, may also be justified in natural settings. First, assume that the data are already k -anonymous and shall be made k-anonymous with k > k . This may be due stronger safety requirements. Then we have t in ≤ n/k . Second, the parameter t in can be viewed as a "distance from triviality-parameterization" in the sense that if t in is small then the input is almost k-anonymous and hopefully needs not many modifications to be made k-anonymous. This may be particularly true when the matrix entries represent ranges (such as age range 40-50) and are not too fine-grained (such as specifying the exact birth day). Third, we study the adult data set (Frank and Asuncion 2010): Preparing it as described in Machanavajjhala et al. (2007) , it consists of n = 30162 rows and t in = 18755 input row types, that is, t in ≈ 0.6 · n. Furthermore, the data set has at least one column with 72 different values, its alphabet size is | | = 72, and it has eight columns. Hence, for this dataset we have | | m = 72 8 ≈ 7.2×10 14 , and so t in | | m . Indeed, t in is a "data-driven parameterization" in the sense that one can efficiently measure in advance the instance-specific value of t in , whereas | | m denotes the maximum possible degree of inhomogeneity.
As to parameterization by output homogeneity t out , we basically show that this leads to computational intractability even when t out = 2 and the alphabet size For instance, the entry in row "-" and column "s" refers to the (parameterized) complexity for the single parameter s whereas the entry in row "m" and column "s" refers to the (parameterized) complexity for the combined parameter (m, s). An entry "NP-hard" means that k-Anonymity remains NP-hard even if the parameter adopts constant values. In addition, "?" marks a currently unknown parameterized complexity status a Meyerson and Williams (2004) b Bonizzoni et al. (2011b) c Aggarwal et al. (2005) d Bonizzoni et al. (2011a) e Evans et al. (2009) is t out + 2, irrespective of the variant of t out -being part of the input or not etc.-which we consider. This holds for k-Anonymity as well as for the more restrictive privacy concepts that lead to the problems p-Sensitivity (Truta and Vinay 2006) and -Diversity (Machanavajjhala et al. 2007 ).
On the positive side we show that parameterization by input homogeneity t in yields several tractability results. For instance, we derive an algorithm that solves k-Anonymity in O(nm + 2 t 2 in t 2 in (m + t in log(t in ))) time, which compares favorably with the Bonizzoni et al. (2011b) algorithm which runs in O(2 (| |+1) m kmn 2 ) time. In particular, when t in is a constant, our algorithm solves k-Anonymity in time linear in the size of the input. Moreover, we prove that k-Anonymity becomes fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter m when t out is a constant, and that k-Anonymity becomes fixed-parameter tractable for the combined parameter (t out , s) where s denotes the number of allowed suppressions in the matrix. We also show that our positive results for k-Anonymity parameterized by t in generalize to the problems p-Sensitivity, DGH-k-Anonymity, and DGH-p-Sensitivity, with similar time bounds. In Table 1 we summarize our results on k-Anonymity and present them in the context of previous results on the parameterized complexity of k-Anonymity.
Organization of the Paper. In the next section we introduce the notation and terminology which we use in the paper. In Sect. 3 we consider the homogeneity of the output matrix and demonstrate that achieving a very homogeneous output matrix (as might seem desirable for privacy purposes) is computationally very hard. This applies to all problems studied in our work. In Sect. 4, we show that for homogeneous input matrices one can gain several fixed-parameter tractability results for most problems considered in this article, leaving the case of -Diversity as a major open question. We conclude in Sect. 5 with a discussion of directions for future research.
Preliminaries
We briefly overview some relevant concepts from parameterized complexity which we use later. We then describe the notation and terminology used in the discussion on k-Anonymity, p-Sensitivity, and -Diversity. The definitions specific to DGHk-Anonymity can be found in Sect. 4.4.
Parameterized Complexity. Our algorithmic results mostly rely on concepts of parameterized algorithmics (Downey and Fellows 1999; Flum and Grohe 2006; Niedermeier 2006 ). The fundamental idea herein is, given a computationally hard problem X , to identify a parameter p (typically a positive integer or a tuple of positive integers) for X and to determine whether a size-n input instance of X can be solved in f ( p) · n O(1) time, where f is an arbitrary computable function. If this is the case, then one says that X is fixed-parameter tractable for the parameter p. The corresponding complexity class is called FPT. If X could only be solved in polynomial running time where the degree of the polynomial depends on p (such as n O( p) ), then, for parameter p, problem X is said to lie in the-strictly larger-parameterized complexity class XP. Finally, we also consider the parameterized complexity class W k-Anonymity. Our inputs are datasets in the form of n × m-matrices, where the n rows refer to the individuals and the m columns correspond to attributes with entries drawn from an alphabet . Suppressing an entry M [i, j] of an n × m-matrix M over alphabet with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ m means to simply replace M [i, j] ∈ by the new symbol " " ending up with a matrix over the alphabet { }.
We say that a row in a matrix has a certain row type if it coincides in all its entries with the row type. In what follows, synonymously, we sometimes also speak of a row "lying in a row type", and that the row type "contains" these rows.
Definition 2 (k-anonymity (Samarati 2001; Samarati and Sweeney 1998; Sweeney 2002b))
A matrix is k-anonymous if for every row in the matrix one can find at least k−1 other identical rows.
A natural objective when trying to achieve k-anonymity is to minimize the number of suppressed matrix entries. For a row y (with some entries suppressed) in the output matrix, we call a row x in the input matrix the preimage of y if y is obtained from x by suppressing in x the -entry positions of y. The basic problem of this work reads as follows.
k-Anonymity
Input: An n × m-matrix M over a fixed alphabet and nonnegative integers k, s. Question: Can one suppress at most s elements of M to obtain a k-anonymous matrix M ? We study two new parameterizations t in and t out , referring to the input and the output homogeneity, respectively, where t in denotes the number of row types in the input matrix and t out denotes the number of row types in the output k-anonymous matrix. Note that-as we show later-t in can be determined efficiently. In Sect. 3, we discuss several possibilities for a more fine-grained and mathematically precise definition of t out .
p-Sensitivity and -Diversity. For the problems p-Sensitivity and -Diversity, the input matrix M consists of a matrix where the last column is declared as private and the other columns as quasi-identifiers. 3 The row types are defined over the submatrix restricted to the quasi-identifier columns (denoted by M qi ). That is, when two rows are identical in their quasi-identifier entries-quasi-identifiers for short-then they belong to the same row type, irrespective of whether they differ in their private columns. This definition fits to the anonymization concepts: The more homogeneous the quasi-identifiers are, the easier p-Sensitivity and -Diversity will be to solve. A similar argument does not hold for the private information: Homogeneous private information does not make these two problems more efficiently solvable. Hence, row types are defined over the quasi-identifiers only. Note that Definition 4 implies that in an -diverse matrix each row type is of size at least .
Definition 3 ( p-sensitive (Truta and Vinay 2006))

-Diversity Input:
An n × m-matrix M over a fixed alphabet and nonnegative integers and s. Question: Can one suppress at most s elements in M qi to obtain an -diverse matrix M ?
Hardness of achieving homogeneous outputs
In Sect. 3.1, we discuss some basic concepts of output homogeneity. In Sect. 3.2, we demonstrate the computational intractability of achieving homogeneous outputs for k-Anonymity, -Diversity and p-Sensitivity.
Output homogeneity
There are two cases to consider when investigating the homogeneity of the output matrix:
-The user specifies the required output homogeneity by providing the parameter t out as part of the input. -The output homogeneity is not specified by the user.
In the following, we briefly discuss both cases.
User-Specified Output Homogeneity. In this case, the user wants to specify the number of output row types. Here, we consider three variants: -The minimum number of output row types is specified in the input.
-The maximum number of output row types is specified in the input. -The exact number of output row types is specified in the input.
There is a close relationship between k-Anonymity and clustering problems where one is also interested in grouping together similar objects. Such a relationship has already been observed in related work (Aggarwal et al 2010; Bredereck et al. 2011; Fard and Wang 2010) . This clustering view on k-Anonymity makes the three described problem variants very interesting because they allow the user to specified a minimum, maximum, or exact number of clusters which is a useful feature for many applications.
Output Homogeneity not Specified by the User. If the output homogeneity is not specified, then it is a property of the set of feasible solutions. Here, the two simplest properties yield the following two parameters: -The minimum number t min out of output row types among all feasible solutions.
-The maximum number t max out of output row types among all feasible solutions. The parameter t max out is the more interesting one from the point of view of anonymization. Given a fixed number s of allowed suppressions and a required degree k of anonymity, in this case the user of the data is interested in output matrices with as many output row types as possible. Due to the higher diversity more output row types potentially provide more information to the end-user of the data.
The parameter t min out is more interesting than t max out from an algorithmic perspective. Since t min out ≤ t max out , fixed-parameter algorithms with t min out as the parameter instead of t max out are potentially more effective. It is not difficult to think of real-world examples where t min out is much smaller than t max out .
Hardness results
It is a natural question whether k-Anonymity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the number of output types, for each of the parameters discussed in Sect. 3.1. It is easy to see that the problem becomes polynomial-time solvable when there is only one output row type. Answering this question for more than one output row types in the negative, we show that k-Anonymity is NP-hard even when there are only two output types and the alphabet has size four, destroying any hope for fixed-parameter tractability already for the combined parameter "number of output types and alphabet size". This intractability also transfers to all the three variants of user-specified output homogeneity discussed above. The hardness proof uses a polynomial-time many-one reduction from Balanced Complete Bipartite Subgraph: BCBS is NP-complete by a reduction from Clique (Johnson 1987) . We provide a polynomial-time many-one reduction from a special case of BCBS with a balanced input graph, that is, a bipartite graph that can be partitioned into two independent sets of the same size, and k = |V |/4. This special case is also NP-complete by a simple reduction from the general If k > |V |/4, then add 2k − |V |/2 isolated vertices to each of A and B. We devise a reduction from BCBS with a balanced input graph and k = |V |/4 to show the NP-hardness of k-Anonymity. This reduction also introduces the basic structure of the constructions used in all the hardness proofs in this work.
Proposition 1 k-Anonymity is NP-complete for two output row types and alphabet size four.
Proof We only have to prove NP-hardness, since containment in NP is clear. Let (G, n/4) be a BCBS-instance where G = (V, E) is a balanced bipartite graph, and where n := |V |. Let A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n/2 } and B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n/2 } be the two vertex partition classes of G. We construct an (n/4 + 1)-Anonymity-instance that is a yes-instance if and only if (G, n/4) ∈ BCBS. To this end, the main idea is to use a matrix expressing the adjacencies between A and B as the input matrix. Partition class A corresponds to the rows and partition class B corresponds to the columns. The salient points of our reduction are as follows. 1. By making a matrix with 2x rows x-anonymous we ensure that there are at most two output types. One of the types, the solution type, corresponds to the solution set of the original instance: Solution set vertices from A are represented by rows that are preimages of rows in the solution type and solution set vertices from B are represented by columns in the solution type that are not suppressed. 2. We add one row that contains the -symbol in each entry. Since the -symbol is not used in any other row, this enforces the other output type to be fully suppressed, that is, each column is suppressed. 3. Since the rows in the solution type have to agree on the columns that are not suppressed, we have to ensure that they agree on adjacencies to model BCBS. This is done by using two different types of 0-symbols representing non-adjacency. The 1-symbol represents adjacency. The matrix D is described in the following and illustrated in Fig. 1 . There is one row for each vertex in A and one column for each vertex in B. The value in the ith column of the jth row is 1 if a j is adjacent to b i and, otherwise, 0 1 if 4 j ≤ n/4 and 0 2 if j > n/4. Additionally, there are two further rows, one containing only 1s and one containing only -symbols. The number of allowed suppressions is s := (n/4 + 1) · n/2 + (n/4 + 1) · n/4. This completes the construction.
It remains to show that (G, n/4) is a yes-instance of BCBS if and only if the constructed matrix can be transformed into an (n/4+1)-anonymous matrix by suppressing at most s elements. We start with the easier direction: "⇒": Let A ⊂ A and B ⊂ B be the vertex subsets forming a balanced complete bipartite subgraph of G such that |A | = |B | = n/4. The (n/4+1)-anonymous matrix looks as follows: The first output type is fully suppressed and contains the all-row, and each row which corresponds to a vertex from A \ A . The second output type contains the remaining rows; in it each column corresponding to a vertex in B \ B is suppressed. These rows clearly agree in each unsuppressed column, because each vertex from A is adjacent to each vertex from B . Hence, each unsuppressed column contains a 1. The fully suppressed output type needs (n/4 + 1) · n/2 suppressions and the second output type needs at most (n/4 + 1) · n/4 suppressions. Thus, the total number of suppressions is at most s.
"⇐": The (n/4+1)-anonymous matrix consists of exactly two output types because having only one type would cause (n/2 + 2) · n/2 > s suppressions (due to the all- row everything would have to be suppressed) and an (n/4 + 1)-anonymous matrix with n/2 + 2 rows cannot have more than two output types. One output type contains n/4 + 1 fully suppressed rows because of the all-row in the input. Since the total number s of suppressions is (n/4 + 1) · n/2 + (n/4 + 1) · n/4 and for the first type one already needs at least (n/4 + 1) · n/2 suppressions, the other type contains at most n/4 suppressed columns. Since no symbol other than 1 appears in more than n/4 rows (by construction), each unsuppressed column consists entirely of 1s. Now, consider the vertex subset A ⊂ A corresponding to the rows of the second output type and the vertex subset B ⊆ B corresponding to the unsuppressed columns. Since at most one row in the second output type does not correspond to a vertex from A (the all-1 row), |A | ≥ n/4. Furthermore, |B | ≥ n/4 because at most n/4 of the n/2 columns can be suppressed in the second output type. Since the second output type only consists of -and 1-entries, the subgraph induced by A and B is a balanced complete bipartite subgraph of G.
Observe that, for the matrix D constructed in the proof of Proposition 1, t min out = t max out = 2: If the matrix D is a yes-instance, then by construction it must have exactly two output types. It follows that k-Anonymity is NP-complete for the maximization of the number of output row types, for its minimization, as well as when asking for an exact number of output row types. In the following, we show that this hardness result holds for all fixed constants greater than or equal to two.
Theorem 1 For any fixed constant t out ≥ 2, k-Anonymity is NP-complete, where t out = t min out = t max out of output row types and the alphabet size is t out + 2, even if the exact, minimum, or maximum number of output row types is additionally specified in the input.
Proof We will show that the reduction from Proposition 1 can be extended such that for any given constant t out ≥ 2, a solution must have exactly t out output row types. An illustration of the reduction can be found in Fig. 2 .
As before, the reduction is from BCBS. First, we construct a k-Anonymity instance as described in Proposition 1. Then, we add n/2 dummy columns (d 1 , . . . , d n/2 ) filled with 1-entries. Finally, for each integer 2 < i ≤ t out , we add n/4 + 1 dummy rows filled with the new symbol i in each entry. As in the previous proof, the number of allowed suppressions is s := (n/4 + 1) · n/2 + (n/4 + 1) · n/4, and the degree of anonymity is k := (n/4 + 1).
"⇒": Given a solution for BCBS, constructing the solution for the extended k-Anonymity instance works exactly like before. Each dummy row occurs n/4 + 1 times in the reduced instance, and so none of their entries need be suppressed. The resulting solution has exactly t out output types : two output types as in the previous proof, and t out − 2 other output types each of which consists of all the dummy rows which have the same symbol.
"⇐": Consider a solution for the k-Anonymity instance. If a dummy row and a row from another type have to be included in the same output type, then this requires suppressing all the entries of both these rows, at a cost of (n/4 + 1) · n suppressions. Since this is more than the allowed cost, it follows that in the output the dummy rows are left as they are. So the dummy rows form t out − 2 output row types. By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 1, it follows that there is a solution for the corresponding BCBS instance which is encoded in two further output row types.
Observe that the (n/4 + 1)-anonymous output matrix consists of exactly t out output row types. Hence the theorem holds for t min out and t max out . This clearly transfers to the cases where t out is specified in the input.
By allowing more symbols in the alphabet, the intractability result of Theorem 1 also extends to p-Sensitivity and -Diversity. Proof To extend the reduction given for the proof of Theorem 1 to also work for -Diversity and p-Sensitivity, we define all original columns as quasi-identifiers, and add one extra private column. To keep the argument simple, we only sketch the proof for 2-Sensitivity. Cases with larger values of p can be handled in a similar fashion, with an alphabet of size max(t out + 2, p).
Corollary 1 For any fixed constant t out ≥ 2,
p-Sensitivity is NP-complete
1. For 2-Sensitivity, set the private entries for the all-1 row and the all-row to "1". For each dummy row type, set half of the private entries to "0" and the rest to "1". Finally, set the private entries of the remaining rows to "0" and set p to "2". 2. For -Diversity, set the private entry for each row to a new unique symbol and set := k = (n/4+1). Now, for every row type containing at least (n/4+1) rows, the relative frequency for each value is at most 1/(n/4 + 1). Thus, every -diverse matrix is also k-anonymous.
The rest of the proof works analogously to the proof of Theorem 1.
Tractability results
As we saw in the previous section, k-Anonymity and its variants--Diversity and p-Sensitivity-are all NP-hard even when there are just two different row types in the output. As such, unless P=NP, these problems cannot be solved in polynomial time-where the degree of the polynomial is a constant independent of the inputeven when it is specified as part of the input that the output has to contain a bounded number of row types. In this section we see that the situation changes for the better when the number of row types in the input matrix is small. We show, for instance, that when the number of row types in the input matrix is a constant, then we can solve k-Anonymity in time linear in the input size (see Sect. 4.1). We then show how to adjust the algorithm to achieve fixed-parameter tractability for the combined parameter (t out , s) (where s denotes the allowed number of suppressions) and for the parameter number m of columns when t out is a constant (see Sect. 4.2). We also derive results for p-Sensitivity (see Sect. 4.3) and for anonymization using the so-called domain generalization hierarchies (see Sect. 4.4). The algorithms described in this section find solutions that have at most t out many output row types. If t out is not part of the input, then by iteratively trying the values 1, . . . , t out the minimum value such that a solution exists can be determined. Thus, if t out is not given, we have t out = t min out .
Parameter t in
In this subsection we show that k-Anonymity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter number t in of input row types. Since t in ≤ | | m and t in ≤ n, this result implies that k-Anonymity is also fixed-parameter tractable with respect Let (M, k, s) be an instance of k-Anonymity, and let M be the (unknown) k-anonymous solution matrix which we seek to obtain from M by suppressing at most s elements. Our fixed-parameter algorithm works in two phases. In the first phase, the algorithm guesses the entries of each row type R j in M . In the second phase, the algorithm computes an assignment of the rows of M to the row types R j in M -see Algorithm 1 for an outline.
We now explain the two phases in detail, beginning with Phase 1. To first determine the row types R i of M (line 2 in Algorithm 1), the algorithm constructs a trie (Fredkin 1960) on the rows of M. The leaves of the trie correspond to the row types of M. For later use, the algorithm also keeps track of the numbers n 1 , n 2 , . . . , n t in of each type of row that is present in M; this can clearly be done by keeping a counter at each leaf of the trie and incrementing it by one whenever a new row matches the path to a leaf. All of this can be done in a single pass over M.
For implementing the guess in Step 2 of Phase 1, the algorithm goes over all binary matrices of dimension t in × t out ; such a matrix A is interpreted as follows: A row of type R i is mapped 5 to a row of type R j if and only if A[i, j] = 1 (see line 3). Note that we allow in our guessing step that an output type may contain no row of any input row type. These "empty" output row types are deleted. Hence, with our guessing in Step 2, we guess not only output matrices M with exactly t out types, but also matrices M with at most t out types. Now the algorithm computes the entries of each row type R j , 1 ≤ j ≤ t out , of M (Step 3 of Phase 1). Assume for ease of notation that R 1 , . . . , R are the row types of M which contribute (according to the guessing) at least one row to the (as yet unknown) output row type R j . Now, for each 1
This yields the entries of the output type R j , and the number ω j of suppressions required to convert any input row (if possible) to the type R j is the number of -entries in R j .
The guessing in Step 2 of Phase 1 takes time exponential in the parameter (t in , t out ), but Phase 2 can be done in polynomial time. To show this, we prove that Row Assignment is polynomial-time solvable. We do this in the next lemma, after formally defining the Row Assignment problem. To this end, we use the two sets T in = {1, . . . , t in } and T out = {1, . . . , t out }.
Row Assignment
Input:
Nonnegative integers k, s, ω 1 , . . . , ω t out and n 1 , . . . , n t in with t in i=1 n i = n, and a function a :
Row Assignment formally defines the remaining problem in Phase 2: At this stage of the algorithm the input row types R 1 , . . . , R t in and the number of rows n 1 , . . . , n t in in these input row types are known. The algorithm has also computed the output row types R 1 , . . . , R t out and the number of suppressions ω 1 , . . . , ω t out in these output row types. Now, the algorithm computes an assignment of the rows of the input row types to output row types such that:
-The assignment of the rows respects the guessing in Step 2 of Phase 1. This is secured by Inequality 1. -M is k-anonymous, that is, each output row type contains at least k rows. This is secured by Inequality 2. -All rows of each input row type are assigned. This is secured by Eq. 3. -The total cost of the assignment is at most s. This is secured by Inequality 4.
Note that in the definition of Row Assignment no row type occurs and, hence, the problem is independent of the specific entries of the input or output row types. Proof We reduce Row Assignment to the Uncapacitated Minimum Cost Flow problem, which is defined as follows (Orlin 1988) :
Lemma 1 Row Assignment can be solved in O(
A network (directed graph) D = (V, A) with demands d : V → Z on the nodes and costs c :
Find a function f which minimizes (u,v) u, v) and satisfies:
We first describe the construction of the network with demands and costs. For each n i , 1 ≤ i ≤ t in , add a node v i with demand −n i (that is, a supply of n i ) and for each ω j add a node u j with demand k. If a(i, j) = 1, then add an arc (v i , u j ) with cost ω j . Finally, add a sink t with demand ( n i ) − k · t out and the arcs (u j , t) with cost zero. See Fig. 3 for an example of the construction. Note that, although the arc capacities are unbounded, the maximum flow over one arc is implicitly bounded by n because the sum of all supplies is (Orlin 1988 ). Since our constructed network has O(t in + t out ) nodes and O(t in · t out ) arcs, we can solve our
It remains to prove that the Row Assignment-instance is a yes-instance if and only if the constructed network has a minimum cost flow of cost at most s.
"⇒": Assume that g is a function fulfilling constraints 1 to 4. Then define a flow f as follows:
The flow f fulfills the demands on the nodes due to Eq. 3 and Inequality 2. Since g fulfills Inequality 4 and the cost of each arc (u j , t), 1 ≤ j ≤ t out , is zero, flow f has cost of at most s.
"⇐": Assume that f is a flow with cost of at most s. All costs and demands are integer valued, and hence, due to the Integrality Property of network flow problems, an optimal flow has also integer values. Then set
Note that g fulfills Eq. 3 and Inequality 2 due to the demands on the nodes of the network. Since n i ≤ n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t in , also Inequality 1 is fulfilled. Note that f has cost of at most s and, hence, g fulfills Inequality 4.
Putting all these together, we arrive at the following theorem:
Proof The correctness of the described two-phase-algorithm (see Algorithm 1) follows from the fact that Phase 1 performs an exhaustive search, Lemma 1, and (as discussed above) that Row Assignment is indeed the remaining problem.
As for the running time: As described above, Step 1 of Phase 1 (line 2 in Algorithm 1) can be done in one pass of the input matrix, that is, in O(nm) time. The loop starting at line 3 iterates O(2 t in t out ) times. The loop starting at line 4 iterates at most t out times; the condition inside this loop can be checked in O(t in ) time, and the column in A corresponding to an empty output row type can be marked as deleted in constant time. The entries of each R j can be computed in O(mt in ) time, as described above. As we saw in Lemma 1, the Row Assignment problem can be solved in O((t in + t out ) · log(t in +t out )(t in ·t out +(t in +t out ) log(t in +t out ))) time. Putting all these together, the algorithm runs in O(nm
In case that t out is not given, the algorithm simple tries all possible values from 0 to t out . The running time is O(nm
We now show that the exponential dependence of the running time of the algorithm of Theorem 2 on the number t out of output types can be done away with. To this end, we exploit that the problem definition (see Sect. 2) does not impose any restriction on t out . In particular, we are free to look for a solution which minimizes the number of output types. We take advantage of this to show that, without loss of generality, one may assume t out ≤ t in (remember that in this section we set t out := t min out ).
Lemma 2 Let (M, k, s) be a yes-instance of k-Anonymity. If M has t in row types, then by suppressing at most s elements one can construct a k-anonymous matrix M .
Proof Let M be a k-anonymous matrix obtained from M by suppressing at most s elements. If M has at most t in row types, then there is nothing to prove. So let M have more than t in row types. We now describe an operation that reduces the number of row types in M without increasing the cost (in terms of the number of suppressed elements) of obtaining M from M. Call a row type R in M redistributable if, for each row r in R, there is a row type R r in M such that (i) the preimage r of r in M can be converted to the type R r by suppressing in r the -symbol positions of R r , and (ii) R r contains at most as many -symbols as R. Observe that if a row type in M is redistributable, then we can eliminate this row type from M by "moving" each of its rows to a different, at most as expensive row type, while preserving the condition that there are at least k rows per (output) row type. This operation reduces the number of row types in M without increasing the cost of obtaining M from M. As long as there are redistributable row types left in M , we repeatedly eliminate row types in this manner. If the number of remaining row types is at most t in , then we are done. So let there be more than t in row types left in M , none of which is redistributable.
Consider a row type R in M that is not redistributable. Let r be a row in R such that the cost of suppressing the preimage r of r to match any row type R in M with R = R is more than the cost of suppressing r to match R . Since R is not redistributable such a row r must exist. Let R be the row type of r in M. Then the cost of suppressing any row in R to match any row type R in M with R = R is more than the cost of suppressing this row to match R . set of positive integers has a unique minimum, It follows that R is the only row type in M having this property with respect to R. Let f be a mapping that takes each row type R in M to some row type R for which R is the unique cheapest row type. From the above argument, such an f exists and is one-to-one. It follows that M has more than t in row types, a contradiction.
Combining Lemma 2 with Theorem 2 we get:
In the beginning of this section, we remarked that our algorithm implies the fixedparameter tractability of k-Anonymity with respect to the combined parameter (| |, m). This was previously shown by Bonizzoni et al. (2011b Next, we compare Phase 2 of our algorithm to the second step of Bonizzoni et al.'s algorithm. In both algorithms, the same problem Row Assignment is solved. Bonizzoni et al. did this by finding a maximum matching on a bipartite graph with O(n) nodes, while we do it using a flow network with O(t in ) nodes. Consequently, the running time of our approach depends only on t in , and its proof of correctness isarguably-simpler.
Combining parameters with t out
In this subsection we briefly discuss the NP-hardness proof for k-Anonymity from Sect. 3 in the spirit of "deconstructing intractability" (Komusiewicz et al. 2011; Niedermeier 2010) . In our reduction the alphabet size | | and the number t out of output row types are constants whereas the number n of rows, the number m of attributes, number s of suppressions, and the anonymity quality k are unbounded. This suggests a study of the computational complexity of those cases where at least one of these quantities is bounded. Some of the corresponding parameterizations have already been investigated, see Table 1 in Sect. 1. While for parameters (| |, m), (| |, n), and n, k-Anonymity is fixed-parameter tractable, it is open whether combining t out with m, k, or s helps to obtain fixed-parameter tractability. In particular, the parameterized complexity for the combined parameter (| |, s, k) is still open. In contrast, k-Anonymity is W[1]-hard for (s, k) (Bonizzoni et al. 2011b) , that is, it is presumably fixed-parameter intractable for this combined parameter.
Whereas k-Anonymity is NP-hard for constant m and unbounded t out , one can easily construct a fixed-parameter algorithm with respect to the parameter m when t out is a constant: In O(2 m · t out · m · t out ) time guess the suppressed columns for all output row types. Then, guess in n O(t out ) time one prototype for each output row type, that is, one input row that is a preimage of a row from the output row type. Now, knowing the entries for each output row, one can simply apply the Row Assignment algorithm from Sect. 4:
Proposition 2 k-Anonymity parameterized by the number m of columns is fixedparameter tractable when the number t out of output row types is a constant.
Next, we prove fixed-parameter tractability for k-Anonymity with respect to the combined parameter (t out , s) by showing that the number t in of input types is at most (t out + s). To this end, consider a feasible solution for an arbitrary k-Anonymity instance. We distinguish between input row types that have rows which have at least one suppressed entry in the solution (suppressed input row types in the following) and input row types that do only have rows that remain unchanged in the solution (unsuppressed input row types in the following). Clearly, every unsuppressed input row type needs at least one unsuppressed output row type. Thus, the number of unsuppressed input row type cannot exceed t out . Furthermore, the number of rows that have at least one suppressed entry is at most s. Hence the number of suppressed input row types is at most s. It follows that t in ≤ t out + s. Now, fixed-parameter tractability follows from Theorem 2:
Proposition 3 k-Anonymity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the combined parameter (t out , s).
To achieve a better running time one might want to develop a direct fixed-parameter algorithm for (t out , s), remaining a task for future research.
Finally, we conjecture that an XP-algorithm for k-Anonymity with respect to the combined parameter (t out , k) can be achieved.
p-Sensitivity
In this section we describe how our algorithm from Theorem 2 can be extended for solving p-Sensitivity (Truta and Vinay 2006) . We leave Phase 1 unchanged, and add extra constraints to the Row Assignment problem to ensure that the output matrix M is p-sensitive. We first describe this modified Row Assignment problem. We then model the extra requirements using a modified flow construction, and show that this modified version can also be solved in polynomial time. To this end, we for Fig. 4 A small example of the construction referring to an input matrix with two row types, each containing the three different entries "1", "2", and "3" in their respective private column. In the example two output row types are in the solution with a(1, 1) = a(2, 1) = a(2, 2) = 1 and a(1, 2) = 0, meaning that no row from the first input row type is assigned to the second output row type. The lower and upper bounds on the flow over the edges are given in brackets on the arcs: [lower bound, upper bound]. Values not being in brackets refer to the costs of the corresponding arc. If the cost is not pictured then the cost is zero. Missing bounds on the flow indicate [0, n] , that is lower bound zero and upper bound (capacity) n. Labels next to nodes indicate the demands of the nodes "⇐": Assume that f is a flow with cost of at most s. All costs and demands are integer valued, and hence, due to the Integrality Property of network flow problemsan optimal flow has also integer values. Then set g (i, σ, j 
Note that g fulfills Eq. 7 and Inequality 6 due to the demands on the nodes of the network. Since n i,σ ≤ n for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t in , also Inequality 5 is fulfilled. Note that f has cost of at most s and, hence, g fulfills Inequality 8. Furthermore, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ t out it holds that f min (u p j , u j ) = p and f max (u j,σ , u p j ) = 1 for each σ ∈ . Thus, Inequality 9 is fulfilled.
Putting all these together we arrive at the following.
Theorem 4 p-Sensitivity can be solved in O(nm+2 t
The question whether also -Diversity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the parameter t in remains open.
Note that we defined t in and t out as numbers of different rows in the matrix restricted to the quasi-identifiers. From a theoretical point of view the number of different rows in the matrix (including the private column), denoted by t * in and t * out for the input matrix and output matrix, respectively, is also interesting. Clearly, t in ≤ t * in . We remark that -Diversity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the combined parameter (t * in , t * out ): Again take our Algorithm 1 and make some adjustments in Phase 2. After the guessing step in Phase 1, again compute the output row types and the costs. Then one can solve Phase 2 via a straightforward ILP formulation that is based on the inequalities in the Row Assignment definition plus one constraint ensuring that the solution is l-diverse. A similar ILP was already described by Dondi et al. (2012) in order to show that -Diversity is fixed-parameter tractable with respect to the combined parameter (| |, m).
Domain generalization hierarchies
In this section we describe how our algorithm for k-Anonymity from Theorem 2 can be modified to find optimal domain generalization hierarchies.
The domain of a column in the input matrix M is the set of all values that may appear in the column. The operation of domain generalization consists of replacing each value v in a domain with a value v which is at least as general as v, for a suitable definition of "general". A meaningful domain generalization takes each value to a "less specific, more general value which is faithful to the original" (Sweeney 2002a) .
A domain generalization hierarchy (DGH) for a column of a matrix is a sequence of generalizations. The domain of the first generalization in the sequence is the domain of the column itself. The domain of each subsequent generalization is the co-domain of its previous generalization. The range of the last generalization consists of a single value, denoted .
Observe that the notion of suppression can be thought of as a domain generalization hierarchy which consists of exactly one generalization.
We say that M is a minimal generalization of M with a property if (i) M is a generalization of M, (ii) M has the property , and (iii) replacing any entry of M with a more specific value will result in a matrix which does not satisfy the property . See Sweeney (2002a) for a formal definition. The DGH-k-Anonymity problem is defined as follows:
DGH-k-Anonymity
Input:
A matrix M, k ∈ N, and a DGH for each column of M.
Question: Find a minimal generalization of M which is k-anonymous.
This problem is motivated by the fact that we may assume that any meaningful generalization loses information; it is thus of advantage to look for minimal k-anonymous generalizations.
To see how to use our framework to deal with DGH-k-Anonymity, let us take a closer look at the algorithm for k-Anonymity from Theorem 2. The algorithm computes the entries of the output row types in Step 2 in Phase 1. To modify this step to use generalization instead of suppression, we do the following: For each output row type R , set the value at position i to be the most specific value which generalizes the values at position i of all the row types which assign at least one row to R . Since our algorithm is based on exhaustive search, it can compute a minimal generalization such that the output matrix is k-anonymous. Assuming that we can apply generalizations and do comparisons in constant time, we get Theorem 5 DGH-k-Anonymity can be solved in O(2 t 2 in t 2 in (mn + t in log(t in )) + nm) time.
Using domain generalization hierarchies to obtain p-sensitive matrices leads to the following problem:
DGH-p-Sensitivity Input:
An n × m-matrix M over a fixed alphabet and nonnegative integers k, s, and p. Question: Find a minimal generalization of M such that M qi is k-anonymous and M is p-sensitive.
Similar to the modification in the algorithm of k-Anonymity to solve DGH-kAnonymity, the algorithm for p-Sensitivity can be modified to solve DGH-pSensitivity. Thus we get:
Corollary 2 DGH-p-Sensitivity can be solved in O(nm + 2 t 2 in (t 2 in nm + (n + | | · t in ) 4 log(n + | | · t in ))) time.
Conclusion
In this paper we looked at the effect of input and output homogeneity on the complexity of four combinatorial data anonymization problems, namely k-Anonymity, DGHk-Anonymity, p-Sensitivity, and -Diversity. We took the number of row types as the measure of homogeneity. We showed that while the problems remain NP-hard even when the number of row types required in the output is a small constant, three of the problems become tractable-in the parameterized sense-when the number of input row types is small.
Our studies so far are purely theoretical. While our results contribute to a better understanding of how structural properties of the data matrices may influence the computational complexity of the-in general NP-hard-data anonymization problems studied here, it remains unclear whether some of the proposed algorithms may turn useful for practical purposes. It seems clear, however, that trying to further shrink exponential factors such as 2 t 2 in is of key importance and remains a task for future work.
There are several fundamental challenges concerning the investigation of the parameterized complexity of the considered combinatorial data anonymization problems. For k-Anonymity, it remains open whether it is fixed-parameter tractable for the combined parameter (k, t out ). This question directly extends to DGH-k-Anonymity. For -Diversity it remains a major open question to determine its parameterized complexity for the parameter t in . In more general terms, exploring the parameterized and multivariate complexity landscape (Fellows 2009; Niedermeier 2010 ) of combinatorial data anonymization problems seems a natural and fruitful course of action with many natural challenges still left to be tackled.
